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Abstract 
A 2012 Human-In-The-Loop air traffic control 
simulation investigated a gradual paradigm-shift in 
the allocation of functions between operators and 
automation.  Air traffic controllers staffed five 
adjacent high-altitude en route sectors, and during the 
course of a two-week experiment, worked traffic 
under four different function allocation concepts 
aligned with increasingly mature NextGen 
operational environments.  These NextGen ‘time-
frames’ ranged from near current-day operations to 
nearly fully-automated control, in which the ground 
system’s automation was responsible for detecting 
conflicts, issuing strategic and tactical resolutions, 
and alerting controllers to exceptional circumstances.  
This paper continues the investigations reported in 
previous publications. Analyses of data surrounding 
the conflict-resolution task serve as the context in 
which we investigate the interactions between 
controllers and the automation. 
Introduction 
The transition to NextGen will include the 
introduction of conflict detection and resolution tools 
to help controllers perform their duties.  Progress is 
expected to then continue towards higher levels of 
automation, enabling controllers’ working 
environment to move from tactical separation 
management to strategic decision-making.  Such 
automation is envisioned to expand performance 
beyond today’s limits by off-loading workload from 
controllers onto automated functions for the majority 
of routine operations [1]. This introduces a 
fundamental paradigm-shift in which automation is 
allowed to perform safety-critical tasks that today are 
strictly the air traffic controllers’ domain. Careful and 
thorough investigation is needed to better understand 
how the automation performs in such environments, 
as well as the associated human-automation 
cooperation issues. 
Background 
The Airspace Operations Laboratory at NASA’s 
Ames Research Center conducted a Human-In-The-
Loop (HITL) simulation, called SA5, which 
examined separation assurance and function 
allocation concepts in varying levels of traffic density 
and mixtures of aircraft equipage [2, 3].  In addition, 
decision-support tools and ground system automation 
capabilities varied across four operational 
environments (i.e., NextGen time-frames), which 
ranged from a current-day, completely voice and 
manual control environment, to a far-term vision in 
which separation functions were performed almost 
exclusively by the automation, with the controllers 
acting as supervisors of the automation [4]. 
The issue of how operators interact with 
automation is complicated at best.  In complex 
working environments such as air traffic control, 
could you recognize an effective relationship 
between operators and automation? Perhaps.  Could 
you recognize an unsuccessful relationship between 
operators and automation? Hopefully before it’s too 
late.  A further understanding of this issue is needed.  
In the context of the SA5 simulation, this paper 
builds upon previous analyses to explore the nature 
of the interactions between air traffic controllers and 
automation.  Specifically, analyses examined how air 
traffic controllers used automation while resolving 
traffic conflicts.  Comparisons are made across four 
conditions, distinguished by (among other things) the 
level of automation available. 
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The SA5 Simulation 
Although documented in [3-9], a brief 
description of the study’s conditions follows.  
Baseline ‘Current-Day’ Time-Frame 
The Baseline time-frame approximated a near-
term NextGen system, by adding only few 
differences to current-day, fielded operations.  This 
time-frame assumed that all aircraft had Flight 
Management System (FMS) capabilities and 
enhanced surveillance equipage to broadcast their 
position and state information.  Roles and 
responsibilities in the Baseline time-frame were 
identical to those in today’s operations, in which 
controllers were responsible for maintaining safe 
separation between aircraft, and did so with the 
available support of a flight-plan-aided conflict probe 
similar to the User Request Evaluation Tool (URET).  
Controllers issued all clearances via voice. 
Minimum NextGen Time-Frame 
The second time-frame, referred to as ‘Minimum 
NextGen’, added to the Baseline time-frame a limited 
Data Comm implementation.  The Minimum 
NextGen time-frame assumed 25% of the aircraft 
were Data Comm equipped, which enabled two 
primary changes in handling for those ‘equipped’ 
aircraft: the automation would automatically perform 
the hand-offs and transfers of communication for 
equipped aircraft, and all equipped aircraft had the 
clearance to follow their FMS-computed vertical 
profile, unless otherwise instructed by the controller. 
Decision-support tool enhancements were two-fold: 
the conflict probe’s information was integrated 
directly in the data block, shown as minutes-to-go 
until the predicted Loss of Separation (LOS); and 
trial-planning functions were available to help the 
controller craft provisional trajectory changes.  The 
trial-planning functions benefited from instantaneous 
what-if feedback regarding potential conflicts, also a 
result of conflict-probe integration.  Despite the 
presence of trial-planning capabilities, controllers 
still issued all trajectory-related clearances via voice, 
as Data Comm was only available for transfer of 
communication messages. 
Moderate NextGen Time-Frame 
The Moderate NextGen time-frame not only 
assumed that 50% of all aircraft were equipped for 
Data Comm, but also expanded the Data Comm 
capabilities to allow for the sending of trajectory 
changes.  This gave the controller the ability to send 
any route modifications and/or altitude changes 
created through the trial-planning functions directly 
to the aircraft.  The Moderate NextGen time-frame 
also added two specific decision-support tools to 
address the strategic and tactical aspects of conflict 
resolution, based on key elements of Erzberger’s 
Advanced Airspace Concept [10].  In the presence of 
a detected conflict, controllers could invoke an Auto-
Resolver algorithm to request a new trajectory from 
the automation that resolved the conflict.  Presented 
in the form of a trial-plan, the controller could then 
send the trajectory change to the aircraft via Data 
Comm, just as if they had manually created the trial-
plan themselves, or modify it, making any desired 
adjustments before sending it to the aircraft.  Several 
access points were available to the Auto-Resolver, 
offering a means for the controller to communicate 
vertical, lateral, and/or aircraft-specific preferences to 
the automation [5].  While the Auto-Resolver 
addressed conflicts with medium-term or ‘strategic’ 
time-horizons (typically less than eight minutes until 
LOS), the Tactical Separation Assured Flight 
Environment (TSAFE) algorithm was available to 
provide advisories in response to any short-term, 
‘tactical’ conflicts (less than three minutes until LOS) 
[10].  In the event of a short-term conflict, TSAFE 
would compute the aircraft heading changes needed 
to avoid the pending LOS. TSAFE then displayed the 
suggested headings to the controllers in the 5th line of 
the aircraft’s data block.  The advisories were 
informational only – action was still required on 
behalf of the controller to resolve the conflict, and 
whether or not they incorporated the TSAFE 
advisories while doing so, was at their discretion. 
Maximum NextGen Time-Frame 
The Maximum NextGen time-frame assumed all 
aircraft had Data Comm equipage, but more 
importantly, it represented a significant change to the 
air traffic operations.  With full Data Comm 
equipage, it was technically possible to send all 
instructions electronically, enabling a new 
distribution of tasks between the controller and 
automation- with both members of the sector team 
using Data Comm to take care of certain 
responsibilities.   
The automation’s responsibilities included six 
tasks: 1) detecting conflicts, 2) using TSAFE 
  
advisories to avoid separation violations, 3) using the 
Auto-Resolver to resolve medium-term conflicts 
(within certain pre-defined limits), 4) for aircraft 
receiving a TSAFE instruction, also sending a new 
trajectory to put the aircraft back on course to rejoin 
its original route, 5) all hand-offs and transfers of 
communication, and 4) alerting the controller to any 
problems or exceptional situations.  Meanwhile, the 
controller was responsible for supervising the 
automation and for resolving any situations flagged 
to them by the automation.  Controllers also had the 
option to inhibit the automation for selected aircraft, 
similar to a manual over-ride, allowing them to 
address a particular situation in their own manner. 
Simulated Airspace and Traffic Scenarios 
The simulated airspace used for this study, 
shown in Figure 1, consisted of five adjacent test 
sectors, all in the high-altitude (flight-level 330 and 
above) en route airspace of Cleveland Air Route 
Traffic Control Center (ZOB).  The test airspace 
spanned two areas of specialization, which grouped 
three of the sectors in a ‘North’ area, and two sectors 
in a ‘South’ area.  One participant, working as the 
radar controller, and one supporting confederate 
controller working as the radar associate (D-side), 
staffed each of the five sectors. However, the D-sides 
were not necessarily always staffed.  Instead, each 
area of specialization (housed in separate rooms) had 
an area supervisor monitoring the traffic situation and 
controller workload, who decided when to staff the 
D-side position, based on their determination of when 
the radar controller needed additional support.  
Confederate “ghost” controllers were responsible for 
the airspace surrounding the test area.   
 
Figure 1. Test airspace used for the simulation. 
Originally based on actual traffic flows from the 
ZOB area, the traffic scenarios included a mix of 
arrivals and departures from nearby airports, as well 
as overflights.  Combined with the different sector 
geometries, the scenarios provided natural variations 
in complexity across the sectors.  Traffic levels were 
representative of today’s operations, with a Monitor 
Alert Parameter (MAP) value of 18 aircraft per 
sector.  However, as the study progressed through the 
different NextGen time-frames, each new condition 
saw an increased level of traffic.  There was a 
concern that as the technologies associated with each 
time-frame were introduced, the operations would 
require little-to-no workload and would not fully 
exercise the concepts.  In response, the increasing 
traffic levels sought to expose the participants to 
varying degrees of workload, thereby more 
rigorously testing the different operations.  As a 
result, the traffic levels increased by 20%, 50% and 
100%, translating to MAP values of 22, 27, and 36 
aircraft per sector in the Minimum, Moderate, and 
Maximum NextGen time-frames, respectively. 
Participants and Equipment 
Six current Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) front-line managers, and one recently-retired 
front-line manager, served as primary participants; 
five as radar controllers and two as area supervisors. 
Additionally, eight retired controllers supported the 
test participants by assuming the D-side and ‘ghost’ 
controller roles.  Twenty pilots, with general aviation, 
corporate, and type-rated qualifications, operated the 
aircraft workstations.  All participants received 
payment for their participation in the study. 
The primary simulation platform used for the 
study was the Multi Aircraft Control System (MACS) 
[2], which, for each controller workstation, hosted a 
Display System Replacement (DSR) emulation on a 
large-format monitor.  The controller workstation 
also included a specialized keyboard and trackball, 
similar to those used in current air traffic control 
facilities, as well as a custom, stand-alone voice 
application emulating the fielded communication 
system. Data recorded and collected at each 
workstation included aircraft flight states, operator 
task data and workload, automation states, voice 
communications, etc.   
  
Previous Findings 
The simulation generated a rich set of data, 
providing many valuable insights.  Prior work has 
reported results on the impact of traffic density and 
sharing of intent information on flight-path efficiency 
[3].  Other analyses explored the relationship 
between recorded separation violations, and the 
nature of the conflicts that led to their occurrence, as 
well as the controllers’ interactions with the conflict 
detection and resolution tools [5].  Analyses also 
showed differing tool usefulness ratings between 
strategic and tactical decision-support tools [6].  
Additionally, an investigation of the factors 
contributing to workload across the four time-frames 
identified counts of conflicts, transitioning aircraft, 
and non-Data Comm-equipped aircraft, as well-
correlated with the controllers’ reported workload 
[7].  Another analyses examined how the controllers 
interacted with the automation, and how the traffic 
situations unique to each sector influenced those 
interactions [8], while yet another analyses focused 
just on the controllers’ decisions to inhibit the 
automation [9]. 
Method 
While extensive, the analyses to-date have not 
closely examined how the controllers resolved 
conflicts under the different NextGen time-frames.  
While [3] and [4] offer complete overviews of the 
study, their detail is very general.  Results from [5] 
and [6] provide initial insights on the conflict-
resolution task, but do so from a limited scope: both 
focused specifically on the Moderate NextGen time-
frame, as it exhibited several unique traits that 
warranted targeted investigations.  The findings in [8] 
and [9] also hint at this subject, but only in the 
context of the Maximum NextGen time-frame: [8] 
was more concerned with the link between general 
automation usage and individual sector 
characteristics, while [9] was even more specific, 
looking at trends in the automation-inhibition actions.   
This paper continues the analysis of the SA5 
data, exploring two areas.  First, characterizations of 
all the addressed conflict situations are made to 
provide context for the controllers’ actions, and to 
describe how the different NextGen time-frames 
impacted the traffic picture.  Second, the sector 
teams’ specific actions in response to conflicts are 
studied to identify any trends and/or strategies in 
their resolutions, and to see if the various NextGen 
time-frames showed any effect on the manner in 
which conflicts were addressed.   
The analyses in this paper all share the same 
starting point: the set of selected conflicts.  An initial 
look at the data revealed that some detected conflicts 
were never addressed by any action on behalf of the 
controller or the automation.  False alerts are the 
most likely cause here, which contribute little to this 
paper’s main focus:  how the controllers and the 
automation resolved conflicts.  For this reason, the 
analyses herein are not in relation to all detected 
conflicts.  Instead, the set of conflicts comes from the 
sum of the following: all conflicts that ended in a 
LOS event, and all conflicts for which actions were 
recorded during the conflict’s duration.  For conflicts 
meeting either selection criteria, the first and last 
times at which a given conflict was ‘active’ (i.e., 
logged in the data), defined the conflict’s window of 
duration.  Further examination of the data files then 
produced a compilation of all related actions logged 
during the conflict’s window of duration.  A final 
filtering of the data removed cases in which the 
recorded action couldn’t be traced back to the 
conflict-detection task (e.g., the only action logged 
during the conflict’s window of duration was a 
transfer of communication message). 
Organizing the data on the sector teams’ actions 
benefited from ‘action trees’, which mapped the 
possible actions into relevant maneuver categories 
(i.e., altitude, speed, etc.).  As an example, Figure 2 
shows the Baseline condition’s action tree.  Other 
parameters associated with the actions afforded 
further investigations.  The time stamps of each 
action, and their relation to the conflict’s time of first 
 
Figure 2. Action tree representing possible ATC 
actions within the Baseline condition. 
  
detection, as well as which aircraft the controllers 
maneuvered in order to solve the conflict, help 
explore how controllers chose to resolve traffic 
conflicts. 
Results 
The analyses presented in this paper examine 
how controllers chose to solve conflicts, and in 
particular, search for any sensitivities in the data to 
the different NextGen time-frames.  Breakdowns of 
the analyzed set of conflicts are followed by an 
examination of the sector teams’ actions.   
Conflicts Acted Upon 
To help understand the actions in response to the 
analyzed conflicts, an initial examination of the data 
first describes the conflicts themselves. The set of 
analyzed conflicts - that is, conflicts ending in 
separation violations or for which existed logs of 
relevant actions, consisted of 1076 total conflicts.  As 
expected, the number of conflicts worked by the 
controllers increased across the study’s different 
time-frames, in correspondence with the increasing 
levels of traffic associated with each time-frame.  
Figure 3 illustrates these counts, which also show the 
number of conflicts worked by the different sectors.  
Sectors ZOB59 and ZOB79 experienced similarly 
high numbers of conflicts: working 291 (27%) and 
265 (25%) of all analyzed conflicts, respectively.  By 
 
 
Figure 3. Conflict counts across the study’s four 
conditions. 
comparison, sectors ZOB38 and ZOB49 worked 166 
(15%) and 141 (13%) of the analyzed conflicts.    
Time until predicted LOS 
At the moment a conflict was first detected, the 
amount of time remaining until the automation 
predicted the conflicting aircraft would violate the 
separation minima serves as a measure of conflict 
urgency.  A conflict initially detected with little time 
remaining would be more urgent than a conflict first 
detected with still many minutes-to-go.  For the set of 
analyzed conflicts, the distribution of their initial 
time until predicted LOS is shown in Figure 4.  The 
top two portions of the figure show the distributions 
for the Baseline and Minimum NextGen time-frames, 
and share a common y-axis scale for comparison.  
The bottom two portions of the figure have a 
different y-axis scale, showing the distributions of the 
Moderate and Maximum NextGen time-frames.  The 
data clearly shows conflicts occurring across the full 
range of detection look-ahead times and, as expected, 
a strong skew towards conflicts detected in the 
earlier, strategic time-horizon.  For each of the 
respective conditions, tactical conflicts (detected at 
three or less minutes-to-go) made up only 8%, 13%, 
13%, and 4% of all conflicts, strategic conflicts 
(detected between three and eight minutes-to-go) 
accounted for 32%, 40%, 28%, and 31% of all 
conflicts, and conflicts detected with more than eight 
minutes-to-go made up 60%, 47%, 59%, and 66% 
(the majority) of all conflicts.  The Moderate 
NextGen time-frame saw the highest number of 
short-term conflicts, offering support to the 
challenges and difficulties unique to that condition, 
theorized in [5] and [6]. 
Predicted Vertical State 
Another way to describe a conflict is by 
examining the aircraft involved.  Their predicted 
vertical states, to some extent, provide a simple proxy 
for conflict complexity.  For an aircraft in conflict, its 
predicted vertical state represents the automation’s 
belief in what the aircraft will be doing at the 
moment the loss of separation occurs.  An analysis of 
this data characterized the vertical states as either: 
level flight, climbing, or descending.  Since each 
conflict involves two aircraft, the analysis 
categorized the data according to the pairing of the 
aircrafts’ respective vertical states.  Illustrated in 
Figure 5, 1029 (96%) of the analyzed conflicts  
 
  
 
Figure 4. Histograms of conflict time-to-LOS, as 
measured at time of initial detection. 
involved at least one level-flight aircraft, and in 625 
(58%) of the conflicts, both aircraft were in level 
flight.  Also, in the Baseline and Minimum NextGen  
 
 
Figure 5. Counts of conflict vertical-state pairings. 
time-frames, the data shows more conflicts involving 
descending aircraft than climbing aircraft, while the 
opposite is seen in the Moderate and Maximum 
NextGen time-frames. 
Equipage Mix 
Understanding which aircraft were involved in 
the analyzed conflicts also included an examination 
of the aircraft equipage levels.  In the Baseline and 
Maximum NextGen time-frames, aircraft equipage 
level was not a factor since the traffic scenarios in 
those conditions were homogenous: all aircraft were 
unequipped in the Baseline time-frame, and all 
aircraft were equipped in the Maximum NextGen 
time-frame.  However, in the Minimum and 
Moderate NextGen time-frames there was a mixture 
of aircraft equipage levels, and the implications of 
being equipped were different between the two time-
frames.  Equipped aircraft in the Minimum NextGen 
time-frame were automatically cleared to follow their 
FMS-computed vertical profile, and received transfer 
of communication instructions via Data Comm.  In 
the Moderate NextGen time-frame, equipped aircraft 
could receive trajectory-change instructions via Data 
Comm as well. 
The data shows that in conditions where mixed-
equipage conflicts were possible, such conflicts 
played the biggest role in the overall conflict picture 
experienced by controllers.  In the Minimum 
NextGen time-fame, 68 conflicts (47%) were 
between an unequipped and equipped aircraft, while 
170 such encounters represented 50% of all conflicts 
in the Moderate NextGen time-frame (see Figure 6). 
  
 
Figure 6. Counts of aircraft equipage pairings. 
Conflict-Resolution Actions 
Having described the number and types of 
conflicts analyzed, we now have the context in which 
to examine the actions taken by the sector team (i.e., 
the controllers and the automation). Data regarding 
how the sector team addressed the conflicts can 
provide another perspective on the interactions 
between the controllers and the automation.  The four 
NextGen time-frames allow for comparisons between 
how the controller (with or without tools) and the 
automation (when working on its own) resolved 
conflicts.   
When Did the Resolution Occur? 
The first relevant conflict-resolution action 
logged during the conflict window helped to define 
when the sector team began to address the conflict.  
The time of that first action, compared to the 
conflict’s initial detection time, describe one element 
of resolution implementation: timing.  Submitted as a 
proxy for response time, Figure 7 shows the 
distributions of when the sector teams started 
working a conflict.  Presented as the number of 
elapsed seconds between ‘initial detection’ and ‘first 
action’, the data’s leftward skew suggests a 
preference by the controllers to work the conflicts as 
early as possible, perhaps helping them to more 
easily avoid the need for larger maneuvers.  
Interestingly, the skew appears increasingly 
pronounced over the progression of the different 
conditions.  One possible explanation is that as the 
  
 
Figure 7. Histograms of conflict resolution 
initiation, measured as seconds since the initial 
conflict detection. 
level of automation increased, and more tasks were 
delegated to the automation, controllers were more 
able to focus on the task of resolving conflicts. 
  
At this point, it is important to note that when 
describing conflict-resolution action data, the 
Maximum NextGen time-frame requires special 
consideration.  This is because during that condition, 
independent of the controller, the automation was 
also resolving conflicts.  The bottom portion of 
Figure 7, in other words, depicts controller- and 
automation-generated data together.  This makes 
identifying any trends in the controllers’ data difficult 
when comparing across conditions.  To that end, 
Figure 8 separates the controller-generated data from 
the automation’s data, where we see a curious 
discrepancy: the controllers’ data continues with the 
strong skew towards shorter response times, while 
the automation appears content to often wait twice as 
long after a conflict’s initial detection before 
addressing it.   
 
Figure 8. Timing data for conflict-resolution 
initiation, separated by agent. 
A third aspect of timing is easily examined by 
simply taking the product of Figures 4 and 7.  The 
result characterizes the first conflict-resolution action 
in terms of the conflict’s urgency at the time of that 
action.  Together with Figures 4 and 7, the data seen 
in Figure 9 provides a more complete understanding 
of when the resolutions occurred.  For example, data 
from the Maximum NextGen time-frame show a peak 
 
Figure 9. Histograms of conflict time-to-LOS, as 
measured at time of first action. 
in the 7-8 minute bin, which could explain the 
slightly longer response times in Figure 7.  However, 
just as with Figure 7, Figure 9’s Maximum NextGen 
  
data benefits from being split between controller and 
automation-generated data.  A clearer picture then is 
shown in Figure 10, offering an explanation 
regarding the condition’s longer conflict response 
times.  The data confirms it is not the controllers who 
contribute to the issue; indeed, the upper portion of 
Figure 10, when compared to the Moderate NextGen 
data in Figure 9, suggests they addressed conflicts 
similarly, if not earlier.  The peak seen in the lower 
portion of Figure 10 clearly attributes the longer 
conflict response times in the overall picture of the 
Maximum NextGen time-frame to the manner in 
which the automation responded to conflicts. 
 
Figure 10. Distributions of time-to-LOS data 
measured at first action, separated by agent. 
Which Aircraft Resolved the Conflict? 
For a given pair of conflicting aircraft, the 
situation’s resolution can involve one aircraft, the 
other aircraft, or both.  In determining which aircraft 
to maneuver, controllers consider many factors, such 
as the route of flight, or an aircraft’s 
‘maneuverability’: where within its performance 
envelope is an aircraft currently operating, if the 
aircraft is or expects to soon be transitioning to a new 
altitude, etc.  Analyses of the SA5 data examined two 
such factors in order to gain insights into the conflict-
resolution strategies employed by the controllers: the 
predicted vertical states of conflicting aircraft, and 
their level of equipage.  These analyses are described 
in the meaningful context of the aircraft pair rather 
than globally across an entire condition, helping 
interpretations from becoming too abstract.  
For the six possible pairings of vertical-state 
encounters, there existed four outcomes identifying 
the maneuvering aircraft: a climbing aircraft, a 
descending aircraft, a level-flight aircraft, or both 
aircraft.  Figure 11 ambitiously attempts to show this 
data across each of the NextGen time-frames, while 
splitting the Maximum condition’s results between 
controller- and automation-generated data.   
As highlighted earlier in Figure 5, Figure 11 
reiterates that very few conflicts were without an 
aircraft predicted to be in level-flight.   The sparse 
data in the right half of Figure 11 provides just one 
insight: in the few conflicts involving a climbing 
aircraft vs. a descending aircraft, the controller 
preferred to move the descending aircraft.  It was the 
controller who addressed 18 of 21 such conflicts; on 
12 occasions (57%) by moving the descending 
aircraft, while electing to move the climbing aircraft 
three times (14%).  For the three remaining 
occasions, the controller moved both aircraft.  On its 
own, the automation only addressed three of these 
conflicts, and although not nearly enough data to 
draw any conclusions from, always chose to move 
the climbing aircraft. 
When a conflict involved two level-flight aircraft, 
maneuvers to both aircraft were infrequent.  In the 
Baseline, Minimum, and Moderate conditions, such 
resolutions occurred less than 5% of the time.  In the 
Maximum NextGen time-frame, controllers moved 
both aircraft in 16% of such conflicts, while the 
automation did so 11% of the time.  For conflicts 
involving a level-flight aircraft and either a 
descending or climbing aircraft (the two left-most 
portions of Figure 11), maneuvers involving both 
aircraft were again infrequent, but more importantly, 
one trend emerges:  the sector team more often 
moved the transitioning aircraft.  The only minor 
exception to this is seen in the automation’s data for 
climbing vs. level conflicts, where the automation 
moved the climbing aircraft equally as often as the 
level-flight aircraft.  In all other cases, the resolution 
to maneuver only the transitioning aircraft 
represented the majority of the data. 
  
 
Figure 11. Analysis of which aircraft maneuvered as part of the conflict’s resolution, organized across all 
combinations of vertical-state pairings and study conditions. 
Another factor in the decision of which aircraft 
to maneuver is the aircraft’s equipage level.  An 
analysis of the data explored this issue, but did so 
only for the Minimum and Moderate NextGen time-
frames.  One reason for the more focused scope is 
that in the Baseline and Maximum NextGen time-
frames, the traffic was completely homogenous, 
leaving little mystery in identifying the equipage of 
the maneuvered aircraft: the Baseline condition saw 
only unequipped-vs.-unequipped conflicts, while the 
Maximum condition saw only equipped-vs.-equipped 
conflicts.  Secondly, the area in which data from 
 
 
Figure 12. Counts of which aircraft controllers 
maneuvered to resolve mixed-equipage conflicts. 
these two conditions could prove insightful, whether 
the sector team maneuvered one or both aircraft, 
again speaks only to a small minority of the data.  
Thus, for all unequipped-vs.-equipped conflicts 
occurring in the Minimum and Moderate NextGen 
time-frames, Figure 12 illustrates the results 
regarding which aircraft received the maneuver.   
In the context of aircraft equipage level, it was 
possible for the sector team to reach one of three 
maneuver outcomes: resolving the conflict using the 
unequipped aircraft, the equipped aircraft, or both.  In 
the Minimum NextGen time-frame, the sector team 
resolved 51% of these conflicts by moving the 
unequipped aircraft, while 41% of their resolutions 
involved the equipped aircraft.  Interestingly, the 
preference to maneuver the unequipped aircraft is 
contradicted in the Moderate NextGen time-frame, 
where the majority of resolutions (56%) involved the 
equipped aircraft, and the sector team used the 
unequipped aircraft in only 38% of their resolutions. 
Which Type of Maneuver Resolved the Conflict? 
In resolving a conflict, the sector team must 
issue a maneuver instruction to one or both aircraft 
(the latter, we know, rarely occurred).  In simplified 
terms, such resolution clearances can move the 
  
aircraft in vertical, lateral, and/or longitudinal 
directions, as accomplished, respectively, through 
altitude, heading or route, and speed clearances.  An 
analysis of the conflict-resolution actions taken by 
the sector team categorized the data according to 
clearance type, yielding four groupings: Altitude, 
Route (which included both heading and route 
instructions), Speed, and Multi.  This last category 
helped to capture instances in which the sector team 
resolved a conflict using more than one type of 
clearance.   
Figure 13 provides a high-level look at the 
distribution of clearance types across the four 
NextGen time-frames.  In large part, the data reflects 
the increase in the number of conflicts across the 
different conditions, but indicates that the proportion 
of clearances consisting of route instructions did 
increase over the progression of the four NextGen 
time-frames.  Of more importance are the altitude and 
route categories, whose contributions across the four 
conditions were as follows: Altitude – 83%, 82%, 
61%, and 19%; Route – 10%, 7%, 32%, 75%.  
Presenting the data in relation to pair-wise 
encounters, should improve our understanding of this 
seemingly inverse relationship.  An analysis of the 
maneuver type data examined conflict resolution 
actions according to the two pairings used earlier: 
predicted vertical state, and aircraft equipage. 
 
Figure 13. Global counts of maneuver types 
implemented during conflict resolution. 
For each of the six possible vertical-state 
conflict pairings, Figure 14 illustrates the type of 
maneuver chosen by the sector team to resolve the 
conflict.  The y-axis is scaled to 100%, but the actual 
counts of altitude and route clearances are shown as 
overlays.  In addition to minimizing clutter, counts 
for the other maneuver types are not shown because 
of their relatively low frequency and minimal 
influence on this analysis. 
Again, most conflicts involved at least one level-
flight aircraft, as evidenced by the low numbers in 
the bottom half of the Figure.  Focusing then, on the 
upper half of Figure 14, the data appears to display 
three principle trends.  First, speed clearances, as well 
as resolutions consisting of multiple maneuver types, 
contributed only small amounts to the overall activity 
and manner in which the sector team resolved 
conflicts.  For example, the ‘high points’ in this data 
come from the 13 multi-type clearances issued in 
response to Level-Level conflicts during the 
Moderate NextGen time-frame, and the controllers’ 
four multi-type clearances issued in response to 
Descend-Level conflicts during the Maximum 
NextGen time-frame.  Those data points translate to 
7% and 13% of the total number of resolutions to the 
conflicts with those particular vertical-state pairings.  
Secondly, when comparing only the controllers’ 
actions between the four NextGen time-frames, they 
seem to gradually trade an increasing number of 
altitude maneuvers for route maneuvers.  By the 
Maximum NextGen time-frame, route maneuvers 
become the majority of their resolutions, whereas in 
the first three conditions, they issued more altitude 
maneuvers than any other type of maneuver.  An 
imaginary diagonal line, from bottom-left to upper-
right, closely approximates this observation.  While 
similar to the data presented in Figure 13, it is 
encouraging that the trend is still observable after 
removing two extraneous factors: the automation’s 
actions and all vertical-state pairings without level-
flight aircraft.   
The data representing the automation’s own 
conflict-resolution actions helps uncover the third 
finding.  While it appears as if the automation’s 
resolutions align with the controller’s trend to use 
increasingly larger proportions of route maneuvers 
and increasingly smaller proportions of altitude 
clearances, automation-generated data is not 
available from the other conditions.  Without 
knowing how the automation would have handled the 
other conditions, such conclusions can be misleading.   
  
 
Figure 14. Analysis of which maneuver type the sector teams used to resolve conflicts, organized across all 
combinations of vertical-state pairings and study conditions. 
What is interesting however, is comparing the 
automation’s and controllers’ approaches to resolving 
conflicts in the maximum NextGen time-frame.  For 
Climb-Level, Descend-Level, and Level-Level 
conflicts, the controllers maintained a sizeable use of 
altitude maneuvers, nearly 25% or more.  On the 
other hand, the automation’s data suggest a different 
strategy; one that (seemingly in all vertical-state 
pairings), simply uses route maneuvers as much as 
possible.   
Another analysis of the resolution maneuvers 
issued by the sector team examined the data 
according to the three possible equipage pairings, 
investigating whether an aircraft’s equipage had any 
bearing on how the sector team addressed the 
conflict.  Figure 15 depicts the distributions of the 
employed maneuver types, for each of the NextGen 
time-frames.  As with the previous analysis, we first 
examine the controller-generated data across the four 
conditions, and then compare the controllers’ and 
automation’s data in the Maximum NextGen time-
frame. 
It is important to note that the actual counts of 
each maneuver type, when compared across equipage 
pairing, are subject to the traffic mixes of the 
scenarios in the different NextGen time-frames.  
Observations of the relative proportions however, 
highlight several elements.  For conflicts involving 
two unequipped aircraft (seen in the upper portion of 
Figure 15), the controllers’ approach remained fairly 
consistent, primarily relying on altitude clearances.  
The middle portion of the Figure shows the data for 
Mixed-equipage conflicts, those between an 
unequipped aircraft and an equipped aircraft.  The 
data for such conflicts during the Minimum NextGen 
time-frame show a similar pattern to the conflicts 
involving two unequipped aircraft.  Mixed-equipage 
conflicts in the Moderate condition bring an apparent 
change in strategy, where the controllers issued a 
larger proportion of route maneuvers (in this case, 
26%).  The trend to more often issue route maneuvers 
is also seen in conflicts involving two equipped 
aircraft.  The bottom portion of Figure 15 shows an 
increase in the controllers’ proportion of route 
maneuvers, continuing across the Minimum, 
Moderate, and Maximum NextGen time-frames, 
similar to that seen in Figure 13 and the upper half of 
Figure 14.  Focusing on just the Maximum NextGen 
time-frame, when comparing the controller- and 
automation-generated data, the difference between 
the two distributions point to the same observations 
made with the vertical-state data: the automation 
issued relatively few altitude maneuvers. 
Discussion 
Results presented here have identified several 
issues regarding the sector team’s strategy for 
resolving conflicts.  Timing data suggests a
  
 
Figure 15. Proportions of conflict-resolution 
maneuver types, per aircraft-equipage pairing. 
relationship between time of first action and NextGen 
time-frame.  The plausibility of this relationship is 
supported by two theories.  The progression of 
NextGen time-frames included an increase in the 
level of available automation and amount of tasks 
delegated to the automation.  This perhaps had a 
positive effect on the controller’s availability, 
resulting in quicker responses to the conflicts.   The 
different NextGen time-frames also brought 
increasing levels of traffic.  The controllers may have 
anticipated an increase in workload accompanying 
these traffic levels, and adapted their working 
strategy as a result.  The controllers’ theorized efforts 
to ‘stay ahead of the problem’ require careful 
consideration, since it is unknown if their self-
reported workload data (see references [3-4]), would 
capture the anticipated workload, or the workload 
resulting after their coping strategy took effect.  
Another timing issue discovered in the data is the 
difference between the controllers’ time of first 
action, and the automation’s.  While controllers acted 
more quickly than the automation, there is no 
evidence that this discrepancy is bad; it just exists.  
The automation simply followed settings which 
specified that it should not respond to conflicts any 
earlier than eight minutes until the predicted LOS.  
Further research is needed to explore the issues 
surrounding this form of implicit coordination. 
Data identifying the aircraft used by the sector 
team to resolve a conflict provides two clear results:  
both the controllers and the automation rarely 
maneuvered both aircraft involved in a conflict, and 
in conflicts between level and transitioning (climbing 
or descending) aircraft, the controllers more often 
moved the transitioning aircraft.  The latter finding 
can help improve the conflict-resolution algorithm, so 
that when used interactively by the controller, it can 
provide resolution suggestions that the controllers 
may more likely accept.  Aircraft equipage played 
another role in determining which aircraft the 
controllers maneuvered in order to resolve a conflict, 
but did so in combination with the present NextGen 
time-frame.  More specifically, the Moderate 
NextGen time-frame, whose traffic scenarios 
consisted of a 50-50 split between unequipped and 
equipped aircraft, also introduced the ability to send 
trajectory changes via Data Comm; an aspect which 
has significant implications for the conflict-resolution 
task.  For mixed-equipage conflicts in the Moderate 
NextGen time-frame, controllers moved the equipped 
aircraft 30% more often than the unequipped aircraft, 
likely due to this interaction between aircraft 
equipage and the ability to send trajectory changes 
via Data Comm.  
The type of maneuver chosen by the sector team 
to resolve a conflict also shows strong ties to the 
ability to send trajectory changes via Data Comm. 
Controllers issued increasing proportions of route 
  
clearances, eventually over-taking altitude clearances 
in the Maximum NextGen time-frame.  In a voice 
environment, route clearances can be quite laborious, 
perhaps explaining why controllers prefer to use 
altitude maneuvers.  Just between the Minimum and 
Moderate conditions, route maneuver usage jumped 
from just under 10% to just over 30%, and by the 
Maximum NextGen time-frame it was 75%.  In the 
Maximum condition, the preference for route 
maneuvers over altitude is perhaps explained by the 
high traffic levels associated with that condition.  
One possibility is that reducing their use of altitude 
maneuvers helped the controllers to keep aircraft on 
their ‘right-for-direction’ altitudes, thereby 
minimizing the complexity of their sector.  In 
general, the automation rarely issued an altitude 
maneuver.  While this may be less of an issue in 
Level-Level conflicts, improving the automation so 
that it can better utilize altitude, for example to start 
down early an aircraft nearing its Top of Descent, 
could prove beneficial.  It is understood that 
‘teaching’ automation to effectively use altitude is 
not without its challenges.  Controllers can easily 
issue temporary altitudes, with the plan of later 
clearing aircraft to their requested altitude.  An 
example of this would be to stop an aircraft’s climb 
until a conflicting aircraft overhead passes by, 
leaving a clear space for the climbing aircraft to then 
reach its desired altitude.  However, such logic can be 
difficult for automation, since step-climbs/descents 
are not easily sent via Data Comm (i.e., not easily 
read by an aircraft’s FMS).  Additionally, helping 
aircraft (who are not in conflict) reach their requested 
altitude is currently not something the automation 
addresses, but perhaps could.   A simpler way to 
increase the automation’s use of altitude maneuvers 
is to expand the TSAFE algorithm to include tactical 
vertical maneuvers.   
Lastly, while a conflict’s vertical-state pairing 
had little impact on the type of issued maneuver, 
aircraft equipage did.  For conflicts between two 
unequipped aircraft, their lack of equipage kept the 
proportions of altitude and route maneuvers fairly 
consistent.  In contrast, conflicts involving equipped 
aircraft are where we see large increases in the use of 
route maneuvers.  Again, this is likely correlated with 
the ability to send trajectory changes via Data Comm 
in the Moderate and Maximum NextGen time-
frames.   
Conclusion 
The results presented in this paper uncovered 
two discrepancies between the controllers’ and the 
automation’s conflict-resolution strategy: timing of 
first action, and the use of altitude maneuvers.  
Understanding the implications of the former requires 
more investigation, but the latter issue is something 
that has the potential to cause disruptive interactions 
and ineffective team work between the controller and 
the automation.  
The analyses also revealed that of the examined 
aspects of a conflict, two factors most clearly 
impacted the controllers’ resolution strategies, 
expressed in the data as the following observed 
patterns: when transitioning aircraft were involved, 
the controllers more often maneuvered the 
transitioning aircraft, and in NextGen time-frames 
where it was possible to send trajectory changes via 
Data Comm, the controllers more often maneuvered 
the equipped aircraft. 
Further analyses of this data could provide 
additional insights by investigating, as opposed to a 
conflict resolution’s end state, the process by which 
the sector team came to that action.  Did they start 
down a particular path, but then switch to a different 
approach?  Another more challenging exercise would 
be to trace the sector team’s actions down many more 
‘and-then-what’ layers.  For example, analyzing the 
three aircraft-equipage pairings, for each of the six 
vertical-state pairings, for each of the 10 time-until-
predicted-LOS bins, would provide a lucky 
individual with 180 cases to investigate. 
Clearly, more research is still needed to better 
understand the conflict-resolution task’s intricacies 
and contextual factors.  If one assumes a future in 
which controllers resolve conflicts, understanding 
their strategies will go a long way towards building 
useful decision-support tools.  If one assumes a future 
in which conflict resolution is the automation’s 
responsibility, an understanding of controllers’ 
strategies could help the automation resolve conflicts 
according to detailed ‘context-dependent’ criteria, 
thereby approximating the heuristics today’s 
controllers typically develop. 
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